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STATE POWER TO DEFINE JURISDICTION 
 
Sam Jordan 
Christopher Bader 
 
States should have much broader authority to decline 
jurisdiction over federal claims.  The normative 
considerations supporting this doctrine of “reverse 
abstention” have been developed in previous work.  But 
what of the Constitution? The traditional reading, 
reflected in existing precedent, asserts that the 
Supremacy Clause, Article III, and perhaps Article I 
operate together to create an inflexible obligation for 
state courts to hear federal claims.  This reading is 
misguided.  The Supremacy Clause contains no 
jurisdictional obligation of its own force, but only gives 
supreme effect to other validly enacted federal laws.  And 
no other clause provides the authority to impose such an 
obligation on the states.  Suggestions to the contrary are 
based on an overly cramped version of originalism that 
fails to account for the exigencies of constitutional 
compromise and ratification. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose that the federal government decides to pass new 
health and safety standards for the processing of meat.  May it 
enforce these newly created federal rights by requiring states to 
send their inspectors to processing facilities periodically to 
monitor compliance?  It may not.  States of course may not enact 
regulations that contradict the federal standards,1 and depending 
on the scope of the regulatory scheme and the intent of Congress 
they may not be able to enact regulations at all.2  Moreover, a 
state may voluntarily agree to send inspectors in exchange for 
federal funds.3  But a state may not be subject to a unilateral 
command to fulfill federal objectives.4  
Now suppose that the federal government also decides to 
enforce these new safety standards by creating a private cause of 
action available to individuals who consume tainted meat.  May it 
enforce these newly created federal rights by requiring states to 
hear and enforce claims brought under the law?  Now the answer 
is almost certainly that it may.  With limited exceptions, the 
creation of a federal cause of action that may be brought by a 
plaintiff in a federal court simultaneously creates a right for the 
plaintiff to choose to bring that cause of action in state court 
instead.5  Of course, a plaintiff may decline to proceed in state 
court, and the power of removal means that the defendant may 
                                                 
1 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142–143 
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
2 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992); Rice v. 
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
3 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 813, 858 (1998). 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1992).  
5 Indeed, the federal government need not even create this obligation 
explicitly.  See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–58 (1990) (discussing the 
presumption of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and state courts for 
claims arising under federal statutes).  There are some limited exceptions to 
the concurrency presumption.  These include express Congressional directive 
or by “unmistakable implication” found in the legislative history that create 
exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Id. at 460–62.  A court may also find “clear 
incompatibility” between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.  Id. at 
464.  Finally, the “valid excuse” doctrine, discussed further below, provides a 
tiny escape hatch for state courts to avoid hearing federal claims of their own 
volition.  See infra note 10 and accompany text. 
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decline even where the plaintiff does not.6  But the state itself will 
usually have no power to decline, and instead must expend its 
resources to fulfill federal objectives. 
Why is this so?  Why is it acceptable for the federal 
government to commandeer state judges but not state inspectors?  
The traditional answer has been that the scope of federal power 
with respect to jurisdiction is different and greater than other 
federal powers described in Article I.7  The Supreme Court has 
read the Supremacy Clause to extend to federal jurisdictional 
rules, meaning that a state may not create competing rules that 
would deny jurisdiction over a federal claim in cases where the 
federal rule would permit it.8  Scholars uncomfortable with such a 
robust vision of federal supremacy have argued that the Court 
has reached the right conclusion for the wrong reason, and have 
suggested Article III or Article I as a substitute source for federal 
power to impose a jurisdictional obligation on the states.9  But the 
basic premise that state courts have an obligation to entertain 
federal claims has largely gone unquestioned. 
 Largely, but not entirely.  One of us has argued elsewhere 
that this obligation is overly rigid and undesirable as a matter of 
policy.10  And in Haywood v. Drown, Justice Clarence Thomas 
penned a dissent that questioned its consistency with the original 
                                                 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006). 
7 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 
1957, 2012–13 (1993) (combining the Supremacy Clause with the State Judges 
Clause to support such power); Martin H. Redish & Steven G. Sklaver, Federal 
Power to Commandeer State Courts:  Implications for the Theory of Judicial 
Federalism, 32 IND. L. REV. 71, 89–91 (1998) (situating this power in the State 
Judges Clause combined with the Necessary and Proper Clause).  The Court 
has concurred in this understanding, particularly in Printz, where Justice 
Scalia noted, “[t]he Constitution was originally understood to permit 
imposition of an obligation on state judges to enforce federal prescriptions, 
insofar as those prescriptions related to matters appropriate for the judicial 
power.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 908 (1997) (emphasis in 
original). 
8 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009). 
9 See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal 
Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation and the History of State Judicial Selection 
and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 848 (2012); James Pfander, Federal 
Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-
Stripping Legislation, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 212 (2007). 
10 Samuel P. Jordan, Reverse Abstention, 92 B.U. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 
2012). 
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meaning of the Constitution.11  Taking a cue from Haywood, this 
Article takes a close look at the original understanding of state 
court jurisdictional obligations. Part I begins by setting out the 
existing precedent that imposes substantial obligations on state 
courts to hear federal claims, subject to a very narrow exception.  
Part II considers the various sources of federal power that might 
support that precedent – the Supremacy Clause, Article III and 
Article I.  While we certainly do not agree with all of Justice 
Thomas’s assertions, our basic conclusion is that he was more 
right than wrong.  Understood in its proper context, the original 
design of the constitution was not intended to infringe on the 
power of states to define the jurisdiction of their courts.  Finally, 
in Part III we use the narrow question of state court jurisdictional 
obligation to press the broader point that considerations of intent 
and of shared expectations should play a role in any meaningful 
originalist methodology. 
 
I. FRAMING THE ISSUE 
 
States are often willing—and perhaps even eager—to open 
their courts to federal business.  Indeed, a federal claim being 
decided in a state court is unremarkable.  That said, the 
Constitution imposes requirements for how a federal claim must 
be treated once a state court chooses to exert jurisdiction.  First 
and foremost, the state court must decide the claim according to 
federal law, and may not substitute some other law in its place.  
This applies clearly to the substantive rules of decision 
surrounding the federal claim, and in certain circumstances it 
may apply equally to the procedural rules attendant to the 
claim.12  A decision by a state court to hear a federal claim but to 
ignore these obligations is a straightforward violation of the 
Supremacy Clause.13 
 But what if a state decides that it does not want to hear the 
federal claim at all?  Based primarily on pragmatic 
considerations, one of us recently argued that a state should have 
the authority to turn away federal business, at least when it does 
                                                 
11 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S.Ct. 2108, 2118 (2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
12 For a discussion of the precise contours of those circumstances, see Kevin 
M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2006).  
13 U.S. CONST. Art. VI cl. 2.  
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so in a way that does not prejudice federally created rights.14  
That suggestion is a departure from established cases, which 
have consistently held that a state’s power to control its 
jurisdiction with respect to federal claims is constrained not by 
the principle of prejudice, but by those of discrimination and 
interference. 
 Testa v. Katt provides an early and instructive example of 
these principles.15  At issue in Testa was a claim brought in a 
Rhode Island state court against a seller who sold an automobile 
at a price exceeding the ceiling set by the federal Emergency 
Price Control Act.16  Under the terms of the act, the plaintiff was 
entitled to receive treble damages, and the state district court 
awarded just that.17  On appeal, the Rhode Island Superior Court 
struck the treble damages and instead entered a judgment using 
the state measure of damages, which was limited to the 
overcharge plus costs.18  On appeal yet again, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court declined to award damages at all, and instead 
concluded that a federal action for treble damages could not be 
sustained in the state courts.19  The first two of these dispositions 
are constitutionally straightforward.  The district court heard the 
federal claim and applied federal law to measure damages, a 
result that is unproblematic.  The superior court, on the other 
hand, heard the federal claim but then applied state law to 
measure damages.  That result disregards the supremacy of 
federal law, and is unacceptable.   
 The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s treatment of the case is 
not nearly so straightforward.  The court obviously did not award 
the treble damages called for by the federal law, but neither did it 
award damages measured by state law.  Rather, its disposition 
was in the nature of a jurisdictional dismissal, and presumably 
left the plaintiff free to pursue his federal remedy elsewhere.  
That was not enough for Justice Black, who—speaking for a 
unanimous Court—concluded that Rhode Island’s unwillingness 
to enforce the federal law “disregards the purpose and effect of 
                                                 
14 See generally Jordan, supra note 10. 
15 330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
16 Id. at 387–88. 
17 Id. at 388. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
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the [Supremacy Clause].”20  At least since Testa, then, the 
Supremacy Clause has been interpreted to require not just that 
states treat federal claims in a certain way, but also that they 
hear federal claims in the first place.  Or put differently, the 
Constitution affects a state’s power to define its own jurisdiction. 
 That said, Testa did not hold that a state court is always 
compelled to hear federal claims presented to it.  Instead, the 
Supreme Court has consistently declared that a state may refuse 
federal business if it has a valid excuse for doing so.21  Precisely 
what constitutes a valid excuse has been the subject of some 
dispute.  The baseline requirement has consistently been that the 
state must apply a “neutral rule of judicial administration.”22 
Neutral in this context means that the rule does not turn on the 
federal nature of the claim being presented.  It is on this basis 
that the rule at issue in Testa failed.  The Rhode Island Supreme 
Court would have permitted the state court to entertain a state 
cause of action for overcharging (with damages measured by state 
law), but would not entertain a parallel action rooted in federal 
law.  By contrast, consider a rule that says that a state district 
court may only hear claims arising from actions that occurred 
within the territorial borders of the district.  That rule provides a 
valid excuse for refusing a federal claim because it would apply 
equally to a state claim.23 
 So what then of a rule that suits against corrections 
officers may not be maintained in the state courts?  Applying the 
notion of neutrality just developed, such a rule would appear to be 
acceptable because it is triggered by the identity of a party rather 
than the source of law, and would therefore apply equally to 
federal and state claims.  In Haywood v. Drown, however, the 
Supreme Court struck the rule down even so.24  To explain that 
result, Justice Stevens concluded that the neutrality emphasized 
in earlier cases was a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
compliance with the Supremacy Clause.25  The problem he then 
                                                 
20 Testa, 330 U.S. at 389. 
21 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009). 
22 Id. 
23 See Douglas v. New York, N.H. & R.H. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1912); 
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 123 (1945); Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. 
Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1950). 
24 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2115. 
25 Id. at 2116. 
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identified with New York’s rule was that it was jurisdictional in 
effect but not intent.  As for intent, Stevens concluded that New 
York was motivated by hostility to the concept of official liability 
(at least in the prison context).26  But of course official liability is 
precisely the policy embedded in federal statutes, most notably in 
§ 1983, and therefore the New York rule really constituted a 
substantive disagreement with a federal law.  Viewed this way, 
the rule is constitutionally problematic because a state is not 
entitled to disagree with federal law.  And that is true even if the 
form of the disagreement is the introduction of a jurisdictional 
rule that preserves federal rights but forces them to be vindicated 
somewhere other than the state’s courts.  After Haywood, then, 
the Constitution acts as a significant constraint on the power of 
states to define the jurisdiction of their own courts.  States may 
not create jurisdictional rules that apply exclusively to federal 
claims, and they also may not create jurisdictional rules that 
apply to both federal and state claims if the rule is motivated by a 
disagreement with federal law. 
 Writing for himself, Justice Thomas argued in dissent in 
Haywood that the entire line of cases just discussed is 
inconsistent with the original meaning of the Constitution.27  In 
its place, he presented a competing vision of state power of 
jurisdiction that is robust and not subject to federal control.  This 
competing vision stems from a very basic premise:  the 
Supremacy Clause has nothing to do with and nothing to say 
about jurisdiction.28  Instead, it merely defines the priority to be 
given to competing substantive laws once a court (whether federal 
or state) exerts jurisdiction in an action.29  Moreover, although 
Congress may have authority to remove cases that fall within the 
federal judicial power described in Article III from the state 
courts, nothing in that article supplies the converse power to 
compel states to take jurisdiction over federal cases.  Therefore, 
so long as the state invokes a jurisdictional rule to close its 
courthouse doors to a federal claim, the constitution is not 
                                                 
26 Id. at 2115. 
27 See id. at 2118–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Three other justices joined 
the final part of his dissent in which he accepted the precedent set by these 
cases but disputed their application in the instant proceeding.  See id. at 2133. 
28 Id. at 2126. 
29 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2126 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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offended, regardless of the rule’s neutrality or intent.30  
 This reading of state jurisdictional control stands in stark 
contrast to the prevailing view.  That may explain why the three 
justices who signed other parts of the dissent declined to join in 
Thomas’s attempt at an originalist revision of established 
precedent.31  But a broader power to define and control state 
court jurisdiction might be desirable for other reasons, and may 
ultimately enhance rather than undermine federal-state 
relations.32  To the extent that the resistance to embrace such a 
broader power is rooted in a concern about its constitutionality, 
Thomas’s revisionism is worth a close examination.  It is to that 
examination that the next Part turns. 
 
II. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS 
 
The Court and many scholars ground state-court 
jurisdictional compulsion in the constitutional text.33  Originalist 
assessments of the plain language of the enacted text, they argue, 
support the notion that state courts are obligated to hear federal 
                                                 
30 In his dissent, Thomas explains at length the precedent supporting the 
anti-discrimination principle.  See id. at 2126–31.  There, he discusses why 
Testa was a proper decision—the Rhode Island court’s refusal to hear the 
federal claim wasn’t founded on a jurisdictional “rule” that was being invoked, 
but a sua sponte decision based on disagreement with federal law.  Id. at 2129.   
31 Justice Thomas’s jurisprudence highlights the significant theoretical 
tension between originalism and stare decisis.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 
551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (calling for the abrogation of Tinker as 
inconsistent with Framer expectations); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 
469, 523 (2005) (“When faced with a clash of constitutional principle and a line 
of unreasoned cases wholly divorced from the text, history, and structure of our 
founding document, we should not hesitate to resolve the tension in favor of 
the Constitution's original meaning.).  Other originalists share his views, 
though his dissents are probably the most tenacious statements of the position.  
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning:  Not 
as Radical as It Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 269 (2005) (“Where a 
determinate original meaning can be ascertained and is inconsistent with 
previous judicial decisions, these precedents should be reversed and the 
original meaning adopted in their place.”). 
32 See Jordan, supra note 3, at 55. 
33 See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009); Brian T. 
Fitzpatrick, The Constitutionality of Federal Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation 
and the History of State Judicial Selection and Tenure, 98 VA. L. REV. 839, 848 
(2012). 
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claims absent a valid excuse.  In Haywood, Stevens based this 
compulsion in the “anti-discrimination” principle of the 
Supremacy Clause.34  This understanding of the Clause includes 
supremacy commands not only for the substantive law applied in 
a case, but also in the jurisdictional laws which determine 
whether a state court must hear a case at all. 
 Our conclusion, detailed below, is that the Supremacy 
Clause contains no such jurisdictional component.  We echo and 
expand on this point that Thomas made in his Haywood dissent.  
If this argument is true, then state-court jurisdictional 
compulsion cannot be situated in the Supremacy Clause alone.  
Instead, this power must flow from the natural operation of the 
Clause, i.e., the supremacy of a law enacted pursuant to a validly 
exercised Congressional power.  The obvious next question is:  
Where else in the Constitution could a federal power to compel 
state court jurisdiction come from?  The potential answers are 
Article III and Article I.  After deconstructing the Haywood 
Court’s Supremacy Clause anti-discrimination principle as a 
matter of original understanding, we will turn to these other 
clauses and show that, again as a matter of original 
understanding, neither can support state-court jurisdictional 
compulsion.   
 
A. Article VI and Federal Supremacy 
 
The Supremacy Clause embodies a counter-textual 
compromise.  Akin to the Madisonian Compromise, discussed 
more fully below, the Framers and ratifiers crafted a “clear” text 
for the Clause that embodied a compromise far more nuanced.  
The Supremacy Clause’s text is “clear” in that it does not 
distinguish between the kinds of laws states must recognize as 
supreme and binding.35  The reality of constitution-making 
requires us to dig deeper than the supposedly clear surface and 
into the murkier waters below.  It is those depths that the real 
outlines of federal supremacy lay.  In the end, the Supremacy 
Clause commanded obedience to substantive laws, but the 
debates and writings, coupled with a consideration of rejected 
alternatives, suggests that jurisdictional laws are not within its 
                                                 
34 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2114–15. 
35 Id. at 2117. 
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ambit. 
Thomas’s Haywood dissent devotes significant space to this 
argument.  After attempting to establish state authority to 
control the subject-matter jurisdiction of their own courts in the 
face of federal claims, Thomas attacks the majority’s contention 
that there is an “anti-discrimination” principle inherent in the 
Supremacy Clause, arguing that the Clause’s power reaches only 
substantive, not jurisdictional, state laws.36    He sums this point 
up nicely when he states, “[T]he Supremacy Clause does not 
address whether a state court must entertain a federal cause of 
action; it provides only a rule of decision that the state court must 
follow if it adjudicates the claim.”37  Thus the Supremacy Clause 
confers no jurisdiction of its own accord but is merely a choice-of-
law rule.  In this view of the Supremacy clause, federal laws that 
purport to control the jurisdiction of state courts are 
unconstitutional and therefore not entitled to Supremacy.  
Thomas relies on the debates in the Philadelphia Convention to 
show that the Framers rejected the notion that the Supremacy 
Clause compels state courts to hear federal claims.38   
 
1. The Convention 
 
Context is critical in assessing the underdetermined 
language of the Supremacy Clause.  The Convention debates and 
other Founding-era writings provide helpful illumination.  In the 
Convention, the New Jersey Plan was a rejected alternative to the 
Virginia Plan (and ultimately the Madisonian Compromise).  The 
New Jersey Plan required state-court adjudication of federal 
claims “in the first instance.”39  The other major alternative was 
Madison’s proposed the Congressional negative on any state law, 
discussed in the Article III context below, which was struck down 
                                                 
36 Id. at 2123 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
37 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2123. 
38 See id. at 2123–25. 
39 Id. at 2123; see 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 242–45.  The 
precise language from the third volume of Farrand is that it was Luther 
Martin’s “wish and hope” that state courts, and not lower federal courts, would 
hear federal claims.  3 id. at 287.  This is not immediately denotative of 
compulsion, but the language of the proposed plan is sufficient to show that 
such “wish and hope” would have been carried into action if it had been 
adopted.   
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as violative of state autonomy and sovereignty.40   
The Supremacy Clause was drawn out from the defeated 
New Jersey Plan and adopted in the final Constitution, but the 
portion of the Plan compelling state-court jurisdiction was not.41  
Two arguments can flow from this result.  First, the jurisdictional 
compulsion provision was rejected and the Supremacy Clause 
does not intend such a compulsion.42  Alternatively, the Framers 
felt that the two measures were duplicative and chose to adopt 
the Supremacy Clause because it could serve to compel state-
court submission to both jurisdictional and substantive laws 
standing alone.  While the former argument is undoubtedly 
stronger, honest reliance on Framer intent requires us to be open-
minded about the universe of possible outcomes.  Thus we 
acknowledge that the rejection of the New Jersey Plan’s 
jurisdictional mandate can cut either way:  either it can show 
that the final version abandoned that requirement, or that the 
Supremacy Clause was intended to contain that requirement on 
its own terms.   
Nevertheless, Thomas argues strongly in Haywood that 
such context trumps the otherwise clear language of the Clause.  
First, he points out that the Supremacy Clause was revived from 
the New Jersey Plan and incorporated into the Constitution in 
the context of addressing which federal branch, the courts or 
Congress, would best vindicate the superiority of federal law.43  
This argument has some merit in light of the discussion of Article 
III and state jurisdictional freedom below.  It is possible that 
Article III “end[ed] the fight over state-court jurisdiction,”44 
giving state courts freedom to refuse jurisdiction of federal claims.  
                                                 
40 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 72, at 207–15 (outlining and advocating his failed 
plan for a Congressional power to negative any state laws). 
41 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”:  The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 725, 730 (1998) (reporting that the New Jersey Plan 
explicitly assigned original jurisdiction of federal matters to state courts, and 
that Luther Martin’s language for a Supremacy Clause was salvaged from the 
otherwise defeated Plan). 
42 See Solum, supra note 42, at 34 (originalism allows negative implications 
to inform interpretation where positive text is ambiguous or vague). 
43 Id. 
44 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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With that understanding in mind, jurisdictional disputes were 
resolved not in the Supremacy Clause but in Article III.  From 
this would follow the assumption that the Supremacy Clause did 
not address jurisdiction.  This rightly applies the “surplusage” 
lesson from Marbury.45 
Thomas next argues that since (a) Madison’s proposed 
Congressional negative was directed to substantive laws and (b) 
the Supremacy Clause was an alternative to that proposal, the 
Supremacy Clause must be limited to the supremacy of 
substantive federal laws, not procedural or jurisdictional ones.46  
In the spirit of fair analysis, this argument must be laid out as 
less persuasive. 
Thomas provides no support for his first premise that 
Madison’s negative would not reach jurisdictional laws except for 
the footnote comment that Madison thought little of state court 
competency over federal matters.47  He brashly claims that “there 
can be no question” that Madison’s proposal was concerned solely 
with substantive laws and not state-court jurisdiction.48  But, 
what is it about jurisdictional laws that place them outside the 
“laws” of the states as mentioned in Madison’s proposal?49  Even 
if Madison thought ill of state court judges, that is not enough to 
show that he would sacrifice federal supremacy in order to avoid 
conflict with their parochialism.  On the contrary, Madison’s 
letter to Jefferson, cited by Justice Thomas, is ardent in its 
                                                 
45 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
46 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2124–25 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
47 Id. at 2124. 
48 Id. at 2125. 
49 Scholars have devoted countless pages to the differences between 
procedural and substantive laws.  See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” 
and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L. J. 333 (1933); Edgar H. 
Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. REV. 392 
(1941); D. Michael Risinger, Substance and Procedure Revisited With Some 
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 
30 UCLA L. REV. 189 (1982).  More recent work has sought to elucidate the 
more nuanced distinctions between procedural and jurisdictional laws.  See, 
e.g., Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55 
(2008); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure:  Thoughts 
on a Trichotomy, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1547 (2008); Scott Dodson, Mandatory 
Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2008).  Though the different types of laws serve 
different functions, nowhere do any of these authors intimate that 
jurisdictional laws are simply not laws. 
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support for the federal government and the vital necessity of 
federal supremacy.50  It is far more in line with the plain 
language of the proposal to interpret “laws” as granting Congress 
full power over any state law, substantive, procedural, or 
jurisdictional.  Thomas claims that the negative “merely provided 
that state laws could be directly nullified if Congress found them 
to be inconsistent with the Constitution or laws of the United 
States.”51  This misses the critical question entirely: are state 
jurisdictional laws like the one at issue in Haywood inconsistent 
with the Supremacy Clause’s mandate?  The ratification debates 
and other Founding-era writings hint at the answer that state 
sovereignty was too important to incorporate jurisdictional 
compulsion. 
 
2. The Ratification Debates 
 
Nearly every ratification convention expressed similar 
concerns over the broad language of the Supremacy Clause.  
Some conventioneers conveyed this sentiment in vague terms as a 
threat to their “Rights and Privileges.”52  More sensational 
advocates claimed that such a provision would “destroy all the 
laws of the states”53 and “produce an abolition of the state 
governments.”54  The Clause, in their view, would create a federal 
government prone to become “despotic.”55   
The most influential of these attacks on the Clause was a 
circular letter issued by the Albany Anti-Federalist Committee.56  
The letter contained numerous objections to the Constitution as 
proposed, but for our purposes, one of its strongest objections was 
that the laws of the national government 
                                                 
50 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 5 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 23–32 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904) 
(enumerating reasons why federal supremacy was critical, including managing 
factioning among the states, protecting individuals by allowing control over 
state-created injustices, and the general inadequacy of morality or religion to 
restrain the oppressive tendencies of the majority will). 
51 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2125 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
52 MAIER, supra note 109, at 149. 
53 Id. at 191. 
54 Id. at 419. 
55 Id. at 152. 
56 Id. at 333. 
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are to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges 
in every state are to be bound thereby, 
notwithstanding the constitution or laws, of any 
state to the contrary – A sweeping clause, which 
subjects every thing to the controul of the new 
government.57 
 
This letter went so far as to call for wholesale rejection of the 
Constitution, because compromise with the later hope of 
concession was a foolish and unachievable ideal.58   
Of course, compromise was in fact reached, and the viable 
concerns over state sovereignty were thereby assuaged (if only in 
part).  The Federalist response encapsulates the counter-textual 
understanding of the Clause that answered the Albany circular’s 
objection: 
 
The words “made in pursuance of the 
Constitution,” which are fully expressed in the form 
of government submitted to us, are willfully omitted 
by the objectors to deceive the people into a belief 
that the New System of Government will have power 
to make laws in all cases whatsoever[.]59 
 
The Antifederalists’ calls for a “limited and defined” federal 
supremacy60 were thus not answered in-text, but in mutual 
understanding. 
This excerpt in particular refutes the Haywood Court’s 
inclusion of an anti-discrimination principle in the Supremacy 
Clause, because it underscores the vital textual limitation that 
only acts made “in pursuance of the Constitution” are to be given 
supremacy.  Thus, the Court cannot locate any element of state-
court jurisdictional compulsion in the Clause itself; they must 
instead site it in another validly exercised Congressional power.  
The Clause has no force of its own, but only gives supreme effect 
                                                 
57 Address of the Albany Antifederal Committee, April 10, 1788. 
58 MAIER, supra note 109, at 333–34. 
59 The 35 Anti-Federal Objections Refuted, by the Federal Committee of 
the City of Albany, April 1788. 
60 MAIER, supra note 109, at 420. 
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to other powers granted to Congress and validly exercised.  
Bradford Clark has made similar a point from a textual and 
structural perspective.61 
 
3. Early Congress 
 
The records of early Congressional debates bolster this 
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause in light of the 
implications of the Madisonian negative.  There, Congressmen 
fiercely debated the need for lower federal courts.  While we will 
show that the Framers and ratifiers did not imbue them with the 
authority to continue this debate, their records nevertheless show 
that they concluded that they were bound to create lower federal 
courts. 
Representative Fisher Ames explained during the debate 
over the Judiciary Act of 1789 that “[t]he law of the United States 
is a rule to [state-court judges], but no authority for them. It 
controlled their decisions, but could not enlarge their powers.”62  
Ame’s comment concerning the dichotomy of “rules of decision” 
and “authority” is not fully clear without more context, however.  
When examined in context, Ames does not defend the ability of 
the state courts to refuse jurisdiction, but instead argues that 
state courts cannot hear claims under new federal statutes at all 
because “offenses against statutes of the United States, and 
actions, the cognizance whereof is created de novo, are exclusively 
of Federal jurisdiction.”63  Despite not advocating for state-court 
jurisdictional freedom, Ames’s argument reaches the same ends, 
albeit through a broad federal-court exclusive-jurisdiction regime. 
Representative Sedgwick felt that state courts ‘might 
refuse or neglect to attend to the national business,” and so lower 
federal courts were necessary to deal with this eventuality.64  
Sedgwick’s primary aim was to show “how dangerous it would be” 
to make the state governments “sole guardians of the national 
faith and honor.”65  Even though his comments did not reflect 
                                                 
61 Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal 
Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2003). 
62 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 808. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 806. 
65 Id. 
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support for state autonomy, they recanted the common refrain 
lower federal courts were necessary because state-court 
parochialism would undermine enforcement of federal policy.66  
This goal evidences so much distrust of state courts that a 
jurisdictional obligation, which would give a greater share of 
federal business to state courts, would likely be far from the 
Framers’ minds.  Akin to Ames’s argument described above, 
Sedgwick’s conclusions support state-court jurisdictional freedom 
but come to that conclusion from a different angle, one concerned 
more with the danger of state-court undermining of federal 
supremacy. 
William Patterson’s notes on a speech on the Judiciary Act 
in the early Senate debates record that the Constitution requires 
only an oath of “Allegiance and not an Oath of Office,” and 
therefore the federal government “[c]annot compel them to act-or 
to become our Officers.”67   Patterson’s notes are not taken in 
prose form, nor transcribed into such form.  Instead, they exist 
simply as a series of broken phrases which do not give a great 
deal of definite insight into Patterson’s thoughts or the contents 
of the speech itself.  While Patterson’s conclusions are attractive 
to our theory, we must note that this context leaves little 
satisfaction as to interpretive certainty.  One might be loath to 
resort to such piecemeal reflection as indicative of legislative 
intent.68  To place it at a distance of over two hundred years does 
nothing to assuage the reader’s unease. 
Not all speakers supported either jurisdictional freedom or 
exclusive-jurisdiction regimes.  Mr. Stone rested compelled state-
court jurisdiction on federalism concerns.  He argued that even if 
federal courts may one day be necessary, state courts were 
currently sufficient as arbiters of federal law.69  He also noted 
that using state courts for federal claims “would be…one of the 
strongest chains by which the Union is bound; one of the 
strongest cements for making this Constitution firm and 
                                                 
66 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
67 Notes of William Patterson from Speech on Judiciary Act (June 23, 
1789), in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 1789-
1791, at 477 (Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E. Veit eds., 1988). 
68 This is precisely a case of “unavoidably vague” Framer language that 
leaves “substantial uncertainties” in its wake.  Whittington, supra note 14, at 
611–12. 
69 Id. at 810–11. 
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compact.”70  
Mr. Harper argued that Congress “‘cannot enforce on the 
State courts, as a matter of duty, a performance of the acts we 
confide to them.’”71  Harper asserted that there was “‘no cause to 
complain’ ‘until [state courts] refuse to exercise’ the jurisdiction 
granted over federal claims.”72  Here, Mr. Harper pointed out 
that, at the time of the debate, there was no necessity for federal 
courts.73  This is because the state courts were, at this time, 
accepting adjudication of federal rights.74  He saw no need to 
engage in such a demanding enterprise as creating lower federal 
courts until the state courts refused to exercise Congressionally-
given jurisdiction.75  Until such time, Congress had “no cause to 
complain.”76 
This does not undermine state-court autonomy and each 
state’s ability to amend the subject-matter jurisdiction of its own 
courts.  Some later speakers in the same debate forcefully argue 
in favor of lower federal courts, noting that the plain meaning of 
Article III did not leave the creation of lower federal courts to 
expediency but rather mandated their creation.77  Thus, even if 
the judicial balance at the time of ratification was not tested by 
the existence of lower federal courts, when and if it was, state 
courts should maintain jurisdictional freedom.   
Furthermore, the political context as a whole shows that 
federal supremacy did not demand jurisdictional supremacy.  In 
light of the Articles of Confederation, the very failure of which 
was the major motivation for the Constitutional Convention,78 the 
Framers were especially concerned with ensuring an effective 
national government.  A more assertive federal presence was 
required to guide the Union in matters beyond the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
70 Id. at 811. 
71 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2125 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 10 ANNALS 
OF CONG., supra note 122, at 892). 
72 Id. 
73 10 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 122, at 892. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 893. 
78 John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1311, 1365 (1997). 
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any one state.79  Thus the Supremacy Clause ensured that the 
new federal scheme under the Constitution empowered the 
national government to make, enforce, and interpret its own body 
of laws.  This did not include a duty for state courts to adjudicate 
federal claims, but merely an oath to not contravene such laws 
when properly brought before them.80  Madison argued this point 
eloquently, pointing out that state courts, unlike the federal 
courts, were bound to uphold the laws of the other sovereign.81  
Contrary to the majority’s reasoning in Haywood, Framers feared 
a “clashing of jurisdiction” would result in too much power being 
confided in the states.82  To do oblige untrustworthy states to 
adjudicate federal matters would undermine federal authority to 
pronounce and effectively enforce national policy. 
 
4. The State Judges Clause 
 
The fact that Article VI contains language specifically 
directed at state judges does not undermine the conclusion 
reached above.83  Rather, the clause merely reinforces the idea 
                                                 
79 Indeed, while some worked to ensure that the federal judiciary would not 
intrude into matters of local, state-level concern, M.E. BRADFORD, FOUNDING 
FATHERS:  BRIEF LIVES OF THE FRAMERS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
180–81, 191 (2d ed. 1994), this concern is inapposite to the question of state 
adjudication of federal law.  In that area, one is not concerned with federal 
overreaching but instead with a lack of necessary participation from the states. 
80 See THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (“It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the 
confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction, will 
become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the observance of which, all officers 
legislative, executive and judicial in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of 
an oath.”) (emphasis in original). 
81 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 307 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
82 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 829.  Mr. Gerry noted that 
Congress is empowered “to suppress any system injurious to the 
administration of this constitution” through its necessary and proper powers.  
Id.; see also Essay of A Democratic Federalist, in 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST, supra note 91, at 59 (conceding that “in case of a conflict of 
jurisdiction between the courts of the United States, and those of the several 
Commonwealths, is it not easy to foresee which of the two will obtain the 
advantage”). 
83 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“… and the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”) 
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that state judges were bound to respect duly enacted federal laws, 
and did not reach the question of whether they were obligated to 
adjudicate federal matters in the first instance.  The debates at 
the Federal Convention evidence this intent, particularly Mr. 
Randolph’s assertion that, in order to prevent competition 
between the national and state laws in state courts and “[t]o 
preserve a due impartiality” respecting those laws, “they ought to 
be equally bound to the Natl. Govt. The Natl. authority needs 
every support we can give it.”84  Joseph Story echoed Madison’s 
reasoning when he pointed out: 
 
The judges of the state courts will frequently be 
called upon to decide upon the constitution, and 
laws, and treaties of the United States; and upon 
rights and claims growing out of them. Decisions 
ought to be, as far as possible, uniform; and 
uniformity of obligation will greatly tend to such a 
result.85 
 
Story’s concern with uniformity of decision underscores the 
Clause’s substantive focus.  The obligation to enforce federal law 
by taking jurisdiction of cases arising under it is not equivalent to 
the obligation to uphold federal law in cases properly before a 
court.  Decisions will not be more uniform because state courts 
must hear federal claims, but only because state courts must 
sustain federal law in federal claims adjudicated.    
A significant body of other Founding-era writings expresses 
strong misgivings about the unduly broad power of the federal 
government.  For example, many Framer voices cautioned that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause would lead to oppressive 
expansion of Congress’s power.86  Likewise, they feared that the 
                                                 
84 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 203.  Thomas attempted to 
counter the oath-obligation, as noted above.  See supra note 128 and 
accompanying text.  However, as was shown above, his primary source was so 
weak as to be wholly unreliable for a conscientious reader.  See supra note 
129–130 and accompanying text. 
85 STORY, supra note 89, §1839.  
86 New York Ratifying Convention, in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION 398 (Jonathon Elliot ed., 2nd ed. 1888); Virginia Ratifying 
Convention, in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792, 1084–85 (Robert 
A Rutland ed., 1970); BRADFORD, supra note 145, at 186 (danger of “implied 
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Supremacy Clause would effect a practical dissolution of the 
states as coequal sovereigns in the overall federal scheme.  In 
fact, Mr. Gerry, while advocating for lower federal courts, 
expressed a view strikingly similar to the “valid excuse” doctrine 
at issue in Haywood:  “[y]ou cannot make Federal courts of the 
State courts, because the constitution is an insuperable bar; 
besides, the laws and constitutions of some States expressly 
prohibit the State Judges from administering, or taking 
cognizance of foreign matters.”87  Likewise, St. George Tucker 
contended that the reach of federal jurisdiction would “wholly 
superced[e]” the states’ judicial powers by compelling their aid in 
attending to that jurisdiction.88  These reactionary concerns were 
well-taken and were embodied in one of the most fundamental 
principles of constitutional interpretation:  what is not 
enumerated in the Constitution as a federal power is excluded.89  
This notion is strongly at odds with a desire to grant power to the 
federal government. 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
powers”); but see Alexander Contee Hanson, Remarks on the Proposed Plan of a 
Federal Government, in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 241–43 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (discussing how the Necessary 
and Proper Clause will only expand Congress’s powers by necessary 
implication). Despite Hanson’s rebuttal, history has shown the expansive 
nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  John Marshall himself supported 
this view of the Clause as the appropriate one in McCulloch.  McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 354–55 (1819) (concluding that the reach of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is not limited to cases of “indispensabl[e]” 
necessity, which is an interpretation that is “so gross an absurdity [that it] 
cannot be imputed to the framers of the constitution”). 
87 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 828. 
88 St. George Tucker, 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 350–51 (1803).  
Writing on the implications of New York and Printz and their anti-
commandeering principle, Roderick Hills argued that the Founders feared that 
preemption, not commandeering, would emasculate state governments by 
depriving them of meaningful subject-matter jurisdiction.  Roderick M. Hills, 
Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:  Why State Autonomy 
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 833 (1998).  
89 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).  The “default 
rule,” proffered by Thomas himself in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, is similar 
to Marshall’s principle in that it reserves all powers not enumerated in the 
Constitution to the states.  514 U.S. 779, 848–50 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  He discussed in detail how this rule stands even in the face of the 
broad necessary-and-proper power conveyed in McCulloch.  Id. at 853–55. 
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B. Article III and Constitutional Necessity 
  
In arriving at Article III’s final formulation, the Framers 
primarily considered the Virginia and New Jersey Plans.90  They 
arrived at the Madisonian Compromise, which allowed, but did 
not require, Congress to create lower federal courts.91  Many 
scholars in the business of constitutional interpretation readily 
submit to the notion that Article III, section one’s language that 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one 
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish” conclusively established 
the result of the Madisonian Compromise.92  The Madisonian 
Compromise has often been cited for this principle.   
History, however, accommodates a very different reading, 
one that emphasizes the practicality of the Framers’ compromise 
and the real force of their intentions.  Michael Collins has also 
challenged this traditional view of the Compromise on a number 
of grounds.93  We argue here that, including his contribution of 
the prospect of enclaves of federal exclusivity,94 a wide review of 
original sources shows that the Compromise was more settled 
than a mere “may/shall” distinction implied.  Many Framers 
viewed the “power” of Congress to create lower federal courts in 
Art. III as non-discretionary.95  Indeed, they viewed their grant of 
discretion as pertaining only to the “number and quality” of the 
lower federal courts, not to their very existence.96  Herbert 
Wechsler similarly argued in his foundational work on federalism 
that the Madisonian Compromise did not result in an 
understanding that federal courts were capable of not existing, 
but merely that their creation was more expediently left to the 
                                                 
90 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 20–22 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]; 1id. at 242–45. 
91 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2120 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
92 See supra note 1. 
93 See Collins, supra note 54, at 59–78 (arguing that since the Framers and 
other Founding-era writers recognized “enclaves” of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction, lower federal courts were accepted as necessity); but see Pfander, 
supra note 1, at  593 (“The Madisonian compromise left the decision whether to 
establish lower federal courts in the hands of Congress, thus leaving open the 
possibility there might be no inferior courts.”). 
94 See supra note 158. 
95 Hamilton, supra note 71, at 488; infra Part III.A.2. 
96 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 818 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
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first Congress.97  Though the language of the Constitution gave 
Congress discretion in the matter, there are powerful reasons to 
assume that this was merely a linguistic, and not practical, 
exercise.98 
 
1. The Convention 
 
In the Convention debates themselves, much controversy 
ensued from the proposed Virginia Plan, which created both a 
single supreme court and inferior federal tribunals.99  John 
Rutledge argued that lower federal courts would impermissibly 
encroach on state jurisdiction.100  By giving state courts original 
jurisdiction over all federal claims in the first instance, Anti-
federalists could allay their fears of federal domination of the 
states.101  National uniformity, he argued, would be preserved by 
the Supreme Court’s broad appellate jurisdiction.102   
Nevertheless, Madison and others effectively argued that 
inferior federal tribunals were important in ensuring effectual 
national government.  Without them, parties would suffer the 
oppression of “biassed [sic]” and “dependent” state judges and the 
“local prejudices” of a local jury.103  One cannot rely, as Rutledge 
would, on appeals from state courts to the Supreme Court.  
Considering the state of transportation technology in the late 
eighteenth century, Madison rightly noted that such appeals 
would carry litigants far away from their homes, at great 
expense.104  Furthermore, appeals from state courts would 
inundate and overwhelm a single Supreme Court.105 
Wilson offered in support of lower federal courts the 
prospect of cases involving foreigners and peculiarly federal 
                                                 
97 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:  the Role 
of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544, 548 (1954). 
98 See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
99 James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”:  The 
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 696, 715 (1998). 
100 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 154, at 124. 
101 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 164, at 716. 
102 Id. 
103 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 154, at 124. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 716. 
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matters—namely, admiralty.106  Mr. Sherman proceeded to argue 
that lower federal courts would incur great expense.107  In a sharp 
rebuttal, Mr. King pointed out that lower federal courts “would 
cost infinitely less than the appeals prevented by them.”108  
Additionally, Nathaniel Ghorum advocated for lower federal 
courts on the ground that they would give Congress some 
meaningful efficacy.109  Ghorum went on to observe that federal 
admiralty courts were not only already in existence in some 
states, but that there were “no complaints…by the States.”110  
The lack of objection from the states themselves seems to render 
the debate moot, at least in some respects.  One need not argue 
that the federal courts impinge on state autonomy if such a 
system existed without producing the chaos that Rutledge or 
Luther Martin foretold.   
This compromise is also important in the context of its 
alternative proposals.  The primary alternative was Madison’s 
brainchild, a Congressional negative applicable to any state 
law.111  Anti-Federalists sharply opposed this proposal as 
impermissibly broad federal encroachment on state autonomy.112  
The compromise that resulted, then, was a sort of “lesser evil” in 
their eyes.  Nevertheless, while Liebman and Ryan have argued 
that these debates produced a text that was “unusually 
authoritative” in its final form, they also admit that “[t]he 
Compromise…did not resolve the deep disagreement that 
prompted it.”113  Neither side was totally satisfied with the result.  
And, even if the Compromise was authoritative of the result of 
these debates, we argue that the result itself contained clear 
connotations for Congressional action post-ratification.   
The argument that lower federal courts were 
                                                 
106 Id.; see also Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, 
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 59–62 (1995) (arguing 
that many at the Convention believed certain “enclaves” of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction existed). 
1071 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 125. 
108 Id. 
109 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2120 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
110 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 47, at 46. 
111 Liebman & Ryan, supra note 164, at 710. 
112 Id. at 718. 
113 Id. at 707, 718. 
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constitutionally required at the Founding has substantial 
relevance to our primary question of whether state-court 
jurisdictional compulsion is supported by originalist analysis.  If 
lower federal courts were not constitutionally mandated, it is 
theoretically possible that Congress could have chosen not to 
create them at all.  If this was the case, some courts would have to 
have been available to hear many federal claims in the first 
instance.  The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court did not 
extend to every case or controversy cognizable under Article III.  
Thus, state-court jurisdictional compulsion would comport with 
the original understanding that Congress could enlist state courts 
as an alternative to creating a lower federal court system.   
This is the classic argument we attempt to refute.  Instead 
of vesting Congress with discretion to create or not create lower 
federal courts, we argue that the “choice” embodied in Article III, 
Section I’s language was illusory, a linguistic relic that did not 
properly reflect the compromise reached in the Framers’ and 
ratifiers’ minds.  Lower federal courts were, in their minds, 
necessary to an effectual federal government.  If lower federal 
courts were constitutionally required, then there can be no 
argument that Congress had the implicit to commandeer state 
courts out of necessity.  With lower federal courts in place, there 
were sufficient fora in place to hear federal claims of all types. 
Accepting this view, state-court jurisdictional compulsion is not 
supported by Article III.   
 
2. The Ratification Debates 
 
Ratification debates were both diverse and predictable:  
predictable because many of the same arguments and counter-
arguments arose at each, but diverse in the nuanced concerns 
each set of debaters proposed and the uniquely powerful 
arguments some were able to muster.  The debates in the 
ratification conventions over state- and federal-court jurisdiction 
and the creation of lower federal courts fit into this mold.  
Nevertheless, the conclusions that lower federal courts were 
required and that state jurisdiction should be preserved are 
strongly supported by these debates. 
First, most state ratifying conventions were preeminently 
concerned with protecting state autonomy and sovereignty.  State 
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courts, they argued, should retain their pre-existing 
jurisdiction.114  They already had plenty of business to keep them 
busy,115 but overbroad federal jurisdiction might leave them with 
little left to do.116  In another bout of compromise that focused on 
post-ratification resolution, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 
1789 and assuaged state fears by instituting the complete 
diversity and amount-in-controversy requirements for federal 
diversity jurisdiction.117 
The focus on jurisdiction is important here.  Whereas most 
debates focused on the extent of federal jurisdiction, few debated 
the need for federal courts themselves.118  Such courts were 
favored because, as echoed in other original sources, a strong 
national judiciary was necessary to remedy the defects of a state-
dominated confederation.119  These courts would also give teeth to 
a much-desired bill of rights, protecting individuals from state 
oppression.120  In this way, lower federal courts were vital to 
instituting the “double security” for individual rights that 
Hamilton envisioned.121 
Such courts would also save litigants the time and expense 
of travel to the Supreme Court for appeals.122  This point may be 
less relevant for today’s litigants, but the compromise struck at 
the Founding accommodated the glacially slow travel technology 
of the time.  Further, while some argued that federal courts would 
eviscerate state court power,123 others acknowledged that 
instituting state courts as federal courts would serve the very 
same oppressive function.  By constituting state courts as federal 
tribunals, the state courts would forgo their state loyalties and 
uphold federal power at the expense of state sovereignty.124 
A final and vital piece of this compromise was trust.  
                                                 
114 MAIER, supra note 109, at 290. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 417. 
117 Id. at 464–65. 
118 Compare id. at 151–52, 197, 200, with id. at 190, 339, 308. 
119 Id. at 18, 287. 
120 Id. at 445. 
121 Id. at 449. 
122 Id. at 418. 
123 Id. at 65–66, 83 (but noting that the document gained little circulation), 
87, 235, 262, 281. 
124 Id. at 287–89. 
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Ratifiers needed to trust the first Congresses to “do their duty” 
and create lower federal courts.125  Just as the conventions 
proposed amendments for Congress’s post-ratification 
consideration, here they relied on Congress to create lower federal 
courts despite their textual authority not to. 
 
3. Other Founding Sources 
 
Other arguments proposed in various Founding-era 
writings and early Congressional debates echo the sentiments of 
the Framers and ratifiers that lower federal courts were required 
in all but name.  One such argument is that the independence of 
the federal judiciary was essential to its proper function as a 
check on Congress and the President.126  A separate and distinct 
judicial branch, divorced from “jarring interests” and dependence 
on political constituency, was needed to render the federal plan 
stable.127  The state judiciaries were subject to the tides of public 
opinion and thus lacked the requisite independence.128  Since the 
state judges were burdened with political allegiance, they could 
not be used as effective arbiters of federal law.129  Their 
dependence on political support undermined the neutral, 
                                                 
125 Id. at 289, 446. 
126 Alexander Hamilton, Remarks in the New York Ratifying Convention 
(June 27, 1788), in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON at 229 (Morton J. Frisch ed., 1985); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton).  Despite the need for judicial independence, some 
Framers expressed concern over the underestimated power the federal 
judiciary might wield.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 
25, 1820), in THOMAS JEFFERSON ON CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:  SELECTED 
WRITINGS, 1787-1825, at 31–32 (1962); WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 199–200 (2nd ed. 1829). 
127 John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
JOHN ADAMS at 90 (George A. Peek, Jr. ed., 1954).  The editor, Professor 
George Peek, notes in his introduction to the essay that “Adams’ views well 
represented the climate of opinion” at the time, which is exactly the sort of 
consensus view which Thomas should, as an originalist, have sought.  George 
A. Peek, Introduction to John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in THE 
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra, at 84. 
128 Some went so far as to claim not only political allegiance, but also 
personal corruption or prejudice, was a strong reason not to trust state judges.  
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 822. 
129 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §1583 (1833). 
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principled manner of adjudication that was vital to the balanced 
functioning of the federal government.130  Mr. Jackson countered 
this argument by stating that Supreme Court could on its own 
resolve “partial adjudications” by biased state judges.131  
However, even he impliedly conceded that such partiality existed 
and would harm the administration of federal law.132    Thus, they 
could not, and indeed should not, bear a duty to hear federal 
business. 
A further argument toward mandatory lower federal courts 
is that of preserving federal authority and supremacy.  Though 
some feared encroachments on state autonomy by the federal 
government,133 Hamilton expressed the opposite view:  “As to the 
destruction of State Governments, the great and real anxiety is to 
be able to preserve the National from the too potent and 
counteracting influence of those Governments.”134  This fear of 
state influence, firmly grounded in the experience of federal 
inefficacy under the Articles of Confederation,135 would be 
                                                 
130 STORY, supra note 89, §1604-1605; See Alexander Hamilton, The 
Examination No. 14, in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 489 (arguing that a federal judiciary without 
independence would scarcely have the power even to “annoy” the other federal 
departments); THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), in SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 86, at 181 
(noting that an independent federal judiciary is an “indispensable ingredient” 
in the constitutional plan and that it acts as “the citadel of the public justice 
and the public security”).  In the House debate on the judiciary during the first 
Congress, Mr. Vining argued not only that the lower federal tribunals were 
“essential” to fair administration of federal law, but that such power was “in its 
nature inseparable and indivisible” from the federal power to make and enforce 
law.  1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 821 (1789).  Addressing the 
counterargument of the lower federal courts’ great expense, he noted that, 
while some expense was concededly necessary, “[t]hey are the price that is paid 
for the fair and equal administration of your laws.”  Id. 
131 1 Annals of Cong., supra note 63, at 830.   
132 See id. at 829–30. 
133 DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
187 (1994); Brutus No. 15, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 194 (Herbert 
J. Storing ed., 1981); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
134 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Edward Carrington (May 26, 1792), 
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 
86, at 330. 
135 Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 
THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 402 (“The idea of an 
uncontrolable sovereignty in each state, over its internal police, will defeat the 
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counteracted by a strong federal judiciary, not limited to merely 
one Supreme Court.  An expanded federal judiciary would be able 
to thereby protect federal interests more effectively, and act as a 
barrier to state injustices against individual rights.136  Samuel 
Osgood made the intriguing argument that a stronger federal 
government was necessary not only to protect against state 
encroachments on federal power or individual rights, but simply 
to protect the states themselves from either injustices perpetrated 
by sister states or foreign powers, which any state alone might 
lack the power to resist.137 
The necessity of uniformity in adjudicating federal matters 
was also an important reason to establish a large federal 
judiciary.  In the House debates on the judiciary in the first 
Congress, Mr. Smith proposed initially that uniformity in 
interpretation of national law could be achieved by adjudication 
in state courts and appeals to the Supreme Court directly.138  
However, he quickly retreated from that position, noting that the 
constant control by the federal Supreme Court would “dissatisfy 
the people, and weaken the importance and authority of the State 
judges.”139  Others similarly argued that state judges could not 
afford the necessary uniformity of decision and interpretation 
that consistent, effective federal government required.140   
                                                                                                                            
other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious.”); 
Impartial Examiner No. 5, in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 
91, at  199 (“It seems to be agreed on all sides that in the present system of 
union the Congress are not invested with sufficient powers for regulating 
commerce, and procuring the requisite contributions for all expences, that may 
be incurred for the common defence or general welfare.”). 
136 STORY, supra note 89, § 1568; See MAYER, supra note 91, at 261 (noting 
that, in the context of judicial review, Jefferson favored judicial independence 
as a safeguard of citizens’ rights); James Wilson, Government, Lectures on Law, 
in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 296–97 (1791) (Robert Green McCloskey 
ed., 1967) (extolling the necessity and virtues of an independent federal 
judiciary in effecting the “distribution of justice”). 
137 Letter from Samuel Osgood to John Adams (Nov. 14, 1786), in 8 The 
Works of John Adams 419–21 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1853). 
138 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 798. 
139 Id.  He went on to argue that the district courts would be ineffectual 
without greater jurisdictional reach.  Id. (“[I]t appears that the district court is 
not clothed with any authority of which the State courts are stripped, but is 
barely provided with that authority which arises out of the establishment of a 
National Government, and which is indispensably necessary for its support.”). 
140 Id. (“The necessity of uniformity in the decision of the Federal courts is 
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Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire was a particularly 
vocal opponent of the Judiciary Act of 1789 in which Congress 
proposed to create lower federal courts distinct from current state 
courts.141  As discussed at the Convention, Livermore again 
posited that instituting state courts as federal courts would save 
considerable expense for the new federal government.142  He also 
propounded the common Anti-Federalist refrain that “lower 
federal courts, once established, would eventually ‘absorb’ the 
state judiciaries, in part because of feared expansive readings of 
the federal courts’ jurisdictional grants.”143  Other debaters 
shared Livermore’s view, although they were a distinct 
minority.144  Analyzing Federalist opposition to Livermore, 
Michael Collins has noted that “[c]onstitutional insistence on the 
creation of lower federal courts is ‘obviously an incorrect 
understanding of article III’ from a modern perspective.”145  As we 
will explain in more detail later, however, the modern perspective 
fails to account for a more nuanced view of compromise, one in 
which Framer and ratifier intent, and not otherwise plain 
constitutional language, controlled.  For now, it suffices to say 
that the constitutional necessity of lower federal courts was 
subject to some debate, but was in general widely accepted for 
meta-textual political and practical reasons.  Here, then, we take 
Collins’s thesis a step further:  we argue that lower federal courts 
were constitutionally mandated, not only because of the 
inadequacy of state courts but also the institutional, political, and 
structural benefits they needed to provide to the new federal 
system.  
Other debaters at the First Congress rejoined Livermore’s 
motion to eliminate the lower-federal-courts provision from the 
Judiciary Act.  Madison argued that transforming state courts 
into federal ones would improperly imbue state judges with life 
tenure and bypass the nomination process vested in the 
executive.146  This counterargument may be less persuasive in 
                                                                                                                            
obvious.”).  
141 Michael G. Collins, The Federal Courts, the First Congress, and the Non-
Settlement of 1789, 91 VA. L. REV. 1515, 1523 (2005). 
142 Id. at 1527. 
143 Id. at 1531. 
144 Id. at 1563–64. 
145 Id. at 1544. 
146 Id. at 1556. 
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light of recent work by Brian Fitzpatrick showing that state 
courts at the Founding generally employed life tenures during 
good behavior.147  Nevertheless, Madison’s point describes the 
general intuition of the Framers and ratifiers that protecting 
federal interests required a peculiarly federal judiciary.148  
Collins provides another, incredibly clear, example of the feeling 
of constitutional imperative to create lower federal courts: 
 
Gouverneur Morris, who would claim credit for the 
final draft of Article III at the Constitutional 
Convention, once said of Article III: “This, therefore, 
amounts to a declaration, that the inferior courts 
shall exist…. In declaring then that these tribunals 
shall exist, it equally declares that the Congress 
shall ordain and establish them. I say they shall; 
this is the evident intention, if not the express 
words, of the Constitution.”149 
 
Collins further identifies that the true debate over the Judiciary 
Act was not whether Congress could refuse to create lower federal 
courts, but merely whether state courts would be appointed to do 
the job in lieu of separate federal courts.150  We have further 
clarified this understanding:  not only did Congress lack 
discretion over whether to create lower federal courts, the 
significant advantages of institutionally distinct lower federal 
courts and the disadvantages of constituting state courts as 
federal tribunals shows that the argument for using state courts 
was marginal and unpersuasive. 
In Haywood, Justice Thomas attempts not only to support 
state-court jurisdictional freedom but also align this view with 
the long-standing notion of state-federal concurrent jurisdiction.  
Concurrency and obligation are, of course, not equivalent, but 
some highly probative original understandings of state-federal 
concurrent jurisdiction can support state-court jurisdictional 
freedom.  To support his idea of concurrency, Thomas cites 
                                                 
147 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, 854–55. 
148 Collins, supra note 204, at 1556. 
149 Id. at 1561 n.175 (internal citations omitted). 
150 Id. at 1562. 
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Hamilton’s well-known The Federalist No. 82.151  This writing 
clearly supports Thomas’s reasoning that state courts held a 
presumptive competency to adjudicate federal matters, since 
jurisdiction over similar matters was vested in them prior to the 
creation of the Union.152  As such it was not infringed upon 
absent constitutional mandate otherwise.153   
Yet, a close reading of the Examination No. 6 points out a 
surprising contradiction in Hamilton’s philosophy.  In The 
Federalist No. 82, Hamilton is an outspoken advocate of the 
states’ right to maintain concurrent jurisdiction over federal 
claims.154  Conversely, in the Examination No. 6 Hamilton has a 
less glowing opinion of the states.  Rather than supporting state 
autonomy, he argues instead that lower federal courts are 
necessary because of the likely jealousies and prejudices of state 
judges and the inexpediency of delegating to the state courts “the 
care of interests which are specially and properly confided to the 
Government of the United States.”155  Hamilton, then, was of the 
opinion that the states could only tenuously be trusted with 
important matters.  In some of the more foundational arguments 
supporting republican government, many of the Framers viewed 
the people at large as prone to vice and passion.156  Here, 
similarly, the Framers were loath to entrust federal matters to 
state provincialism.  The federal government, by contrast, was 
composed of carefully selected and virtuous men.  They would 
steer the vessel of the nation through the tumultuous storms of 
state prejudice and infighting.  This view, the view that 
                                                 
151 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2120 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
152 Id. at 2120–21. 
153 This power, apparently, did not fall prey to the “big bang” rule that 
struck down other state powers at the adoption of the Constitution.  See U.S. 
Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 803 (1995) (concluding that some 
original state powers were sacrificed in the creation of the Union).  At least, 
the matter is not discussed by Justice Thomas. 
154 See THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 553 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961). 
155 Alexander Hamilton, Examination No. 6, in 25 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 66, at 487. 
156 See generally James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United 
States, in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 348 (Robert J. Brugger ed., Univ. 
Press of Virginia 1987) (arguing that  the States violate federal authority, 
treaties, and interstate agreements, as well as commit injustices, and the 
people themselves are susceptible to sweeping passions resulting in mob rule).  
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concurrency might not be as clearly inherent in our judicial 
system as Thomas believes, underscores the idea of jurisdictional 
freedom.  It merely comes to that destination by a different road.  
Instead of giving such freedom out of respect for state autonomy, 
some Framers sought to restrict state-court adjudication of 
federal rights to protect federal rights from the state bias and 
vice. 
Although the Madisonian Compromise did in fact win the 
day at the Convention, the implications drawn from this 
occurrence are not as clear as the literature portrays them.157  For 
Thomas specifically, arguments in favor of mandatory lower 
federal courts would have aided his ultimate goal of eliminating 
state-court burdens to hear federal matters.  If lower federal 
courts were mandatory, one could argue that states should be 
allowed to refuse federal business, since there would always be a 
federal forum ready to hear the claims.158  Further, a view that 
lower federal courts were required could be used to show that the 
Founders may not have wanted the states to hear federal claims, 
but instead sought to divest them of such power by creating a 
forum for federal business.  Perhaps Thomas thought it was more 
desirable to establish both state competency toward federal 
claims and a lack of power to compel to such jurisdiction.  
Thomas, then, wanted to have it both ways:  state courts can hear 
federal claims, but don’t have to if they don’t want to.  Trying to 
preserve both claims led him to proffer less persuasive arguments 
for each. 
A strong federal judiciary equipped with lower courts was a 
generally popular view.159  Whether to protect individuals or the 
                                                 
157 See Collins, supra note 54, at 61–62 (noting that some among the 
Framers believed that lower federal courts were constitutionally required).  
Collins later discusses the debates in the first Congresses over the possibility 
that lower federal courts were constitutionally mandated.  Id. at 69. 
158 This is indeed one of the normative arguments that can be used to 
combat compelled state jurisdiction over federal claims today.  Since federal 
courts have long been a fixture of the federal government, and are not likely to 
be abolished any time soon, states should have greater freedom to refuse 
federal claims that have their own tailor-made forum.  See Jordan, supra note 
23. 
159 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 63, at 822 (“It is conceded on all hands, 
that the establishment of [lower federal courts] is immutable.”).  Id. at 798 
(“With respect to the first point, it seems generally conceded that there ought 
to be a district court of some sort. The constitution, indeed, recognises such a 
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federal government from the states, the ideals of federalism 
practically demanded a federal judiciary that could 
counterbalance both its coordinate departments and its sister 
courts in the states.  This finding destabilizes Thomas’s 
conclusions regarding state-court concurrency.  It undermines his 
assertion that state-court concurrency was “essential” to the 
Madisonian Compromise’s formulation that allowed, but did not 
require, lower federal courts.160 Since lower federal courts were 
essentially guaranteed in the minds of the Framers and ratifiers, 
the states may not have been indispensable arbiters of federal 
law.  Indeed, the Framers’ evident distaste for state-court 
adjudication of federal matters suggests that they meant to 
reduce, if not totally divest, the state courts of concurrent 
jurisdiction through the lower federal courts.161   
We should make it clear here that the existence of 
dissenting views identified in the discussion above does not in 
itself destabilize our thesis.  We are not attempting to make the 
arguments in favor of lower federal courts for the Framers.  
Rather, we have tried to catalogue the various arguments both for 
and against and have determined that the most popular view, and 
the one embodied in the true Compromise, included mandatory, 
distinct lower federal courts. 
 
C. Article I and Congressional Prerogative 
 
James Pfander has argued that, notwithstanding 
jurisdictional freedom that may be read into Article III or the 
Supremacy Clause, Article I empowers Congress to require state 
courts to entertain federal claims.162  Under his interpretation, 
                                                                                                                            
court, because it speaks of ‘such inferior courts as the Congress shall establish;’ 
and because it gives to the Supreme Court only appellate jurisdiction in most 
cases of a federal nature.”).  Mr. Morris claimed that the apportionment of 
jurisdiction gave Congress a “duty” to create lower federal courts to adjudicate 
those matters outside the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.  11 ANNALS 
OF CONG. 86 (1802).   
160 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2120 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
161 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
162 James Pfander, Federal Supremacy, State Court Inferiority, and the 
Constitutionality of Jurisdiction-Stripping Legislation, 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191, 
212 (2007). 
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the “ordain and establish” language of Article III cannot easily 
accommodate the incorporation of existing state courts as federal 
tribunals.163  Instead, Pfander relies on Article I, section 8, which 
gives Congress the power “to constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
supreme Court.”164  This power, coupled with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, gives Congress the authority to forgo creating 
lower federal courts outright.165  They could alternatively choose 
to “constitute” state courts as federal tribunals.166  Indeed, 
analysis of the Madisonian Compromise may support this view, 
because Madison’s reworked proposal for lower federal courts 
allowed the legislature to “appoint inferior Tribunals,” which in 
context appeared to suggest “formally enlisting state courts for 
national purposes.”167 
While this reading solves the apparent redundancy 
problem between Article I and Article III,168 it ignores three 
powerful counter-arguments.  First, as explored above, the 
Madisonian Compromise left Congress discretion to create or not 
create federal courts in name only.  Their true duty was to create 
such necessary courts to uphold federal supremacy, secure 
individual rights from state intrusions, and accommodate state 
sovereignty and state-court competency concerns.  He relies 
heavily on Hamilton’s account of the role of the Inferior Tribunal 
Clause as laid out in The Federalist No. 82.169  There, Hamilton 
argued that state courts might be adopted as lower federal 
courts.170  But even Hamilton recognized that Congress had at 
least a “two-fold power”:  either institute state courts as federal 
courts or “create new [federal] courts with a like power.”171  
Further, he thought it “absurd” that new federal courts would 
displace existing state courts.172  In the end, Hamilton did more 
in The Federalist No. 82 to assuage critics of the plan for the 
national judiciary than to actually advocate for utilizing state 
                                                 
163 Id. at 203. 
164 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
165 Pfander, supra note 244, at 205. 
166 Id. 
167 Liebman & Ryan, 717. 
168 Pfander, supra note 244, at 205. 
169 Id.  at 216–19. 
170 The Federalist No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton). 
171 Pfander, supra note 244, at 217. 
172 Id. at 218. 
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courts as federal tribunals.  An ardent supporter of the federal 
government,173 Hamilton’s move was consistent with the 
pragmatic approach the Constitution’s supporters had to take to 
avoid derailing ratification. 
Second, and far more concerning, is Pfander’s failure to 
account for the function of Article I.  It goes without saying that 
Congress exercises limited powers.174  To act within its 
constitutional authority, Congress take express, positive action. 
As Pfander acknowledges, the current concurrency presumption 
is only an implicit action under Congress’s Article I power.  Why 
is implicit power so clear and strong in this instance?  There are 
no satisfactory answers.  For example, as a matter of policy, a 
concurrency presumption does not protect federal regulatory 
sovereignty but undermines it by giving states a voice in the 
exposition of federal law. 
 The third reason to doubt Congress’s Article I power to 
oblige state courts to hear federal business relates to Pfander’s 
own formulation of that power.  To constitute state tribunals as 
federal ones, Congress should “simply take state courts as it finds 
them, constitute them as tribunals for certain federal purposes, 
and avoid structural problems.”175  Congress might also “pay the 
states directly to defray the cost of its relying on such tribunals 
rather than being constrained to pay the judges directly, as it 
must under Article III.”176  Congress has done neither of these 
things.  As cases like Brown, Dice, and others show, federal rights 
are accompanied by federal procedures that states must apply.177  
And, while a funded-mandate approach to state-court obligation 
seems consistent with Congress’s Supremacy Clause powers, our 
reading of the jurisdictional-substantive compromise embodied in 
the constitutional debates provides solid ground on which states 
may refuse such a mandate.  Even though funding would make 
the obligation less burdensome, states have the constitutional 
space to refuse such obligations outright. 
                                                 
173 David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History:  Alexander Hamilton, the 
Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755, 879 n.579 (2001). 
174 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995). 
175 Pfander, supra note 244, at 222. 
176 Id. at 204. 
177 Brown v. W. Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 298 (1949); Dice v. Akron, 
Canton, & Youngstown R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952); Felder v. Casey, 487 
U.S. 131, 138 (1988); but see Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 918 (1997). 
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III. INDETERMINACY AND COMPROMISE 
 
There is no controversy in claiming that compromise was a 
part of the Founders’ constitution-making process.  The context in 
which the Framers and ratifiers lived was one of intense debate 
and bitter rivalry between those who believed in the necessity of 
strong national government and those who feared the subjugation 
or dissolution of the states under a domineering federal sovereign.  
The classic view holds that hallmark compromises such as the 
Madisonian Compromise did not resolve the issues raised in 
debate.  Rather, the compromise was that entrusted Congress 
with the discretion to resolve the debate later.  While this view 
accounts for the exigencies of ratification, another theory is 
supported by the historical account and modern theories of 
intentionalists originalism.  Leveraging those theories, we argue 
that constitutional compromises were not always geared toward 
pushing off resolution of a debate, but rather that the language of 
certain clauses were left in the form proposed by the Convention 
in order to avoid delaying ratification further.  Thus, while their 
plain language invites the superficial reading that the debate was 
preserved for post-ratification actors, Framer and ratifier intent 
shows that many such controversies were resolved pre-
ratification, vesting Congress with the mere duty to implement 
the result reached.  This is precisely the view we have advocated 
above with respect to the constitutional provisions underlying 
state-court jurisdictional compulsion.  Before describing this 
theory of counter-textual intentionalism, we will first explore the 
limitations in current originalist doctrine.  We will then describe 
why compromise was a critical element in constitution-making.  
Finally, we will connect up the need compromise with the notion 
that some compromises resulted in counter-textual yet firm 
commands from the Framers and ratifiers. 
  
A.  Originalism’s Indeterminacy 
 
The significant limitations of originalist methodology must 
be recognized if the spirit of honest, rigorous scholarship may be 
attributed to its adherents.178  Perhaps the most fundamental 
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assumption underlying originalism is that there is a cohesive, 
discoverable “original meaning” that inheres in the Constitution.  
The Framers were so numerous and expressed such diversity of 
opinion that a majority, let alone a consensus, on any particular 
issue is hard, if not impossible, to determine.179  Even original-
understanding originalism suffers from a crippling reliance on 
normative assumptions about the competency and beliefs of their 
supposed late-eighteenth-century “reasonable person.”180  This 
lack of cohesion casts a long shadow over the achievements of 
originalism as a source of constitutional interpretation.  Without 
a reasonable majority or a principled objectivity in selecting the 
“interpreter” of constitutional language, the cohesive original 
meaning that transcends from the Founding to our day loses 
much of its luster.   
This evident lack of cohesion spawns another, more 
troubling problem.  Selective citation of Founding-era sources can 
support almost any constitutional interpretation.181  A spirit of 
                                                                                                                            
(pointing out that “neither constitutional ‘textualism,’ ‘originalism,’ or any 
other interpretive ‘ism’ requires [the interpreter] to abandon all common sense 
and reasonableness”). 
179 Whittington, supra note 14, at 605 (noting that one major criticism of 
originalism is that there is not a definite, coherent intent that can be gleaned 
from the “varying intentions” of the many Framers); Lawrence B. Solum, A 
Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin, ILL. 
PUB. L. RES. PAPER No. 08-12 at 4 (2008) (“[T]he multiplicity of framers creates 
problems of conflicting intentions.”). 
180 Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, 
in ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  
A DEBATE 107 (2011).  Lawrence Solum counters that conventional semantic 
meanings exist independently of “psychological states of particular persons on 
particular occasions.”  Lawrence B. Solum, Living with Originalism, in ROBERT 
W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM:  A DEBATE 
147 (2011).  In this argument, he may be referring to a specific level of 
generality at which we assess “conventional” meaning.  We respond to this 
contention in Part III and argue that particular psychological states are 
important to understanding compromise:  we must understand the particular 
intentions of the Framers and ratifiers as they crafted the Constitution to 
understand the intended application of its provisions. 
181 See generally D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (primary opposing 
sides leverage Founding-era sources, particularly dictionaries and other 
sources illuminating Founding-era linguistic norms).  This sort of back-and-
forth originalist snow-ball fight clouds the issue at hand:  we seemingly cannot, 
for particularly contentious issues, elucidate a clear message from the Framers 
as to which interpretation is correct.  This is because, in general, if an issue is 
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scholastic honesty mandates that originalists acknowledge and 
respect the ambiguities, uncertainties, and unresolved conflicts at 
the Founding.182  Professor Kramer suggests that originalists 
take account of all sources from the Founding, including 
sensational rhetoric from the ratification debates, instead of 
blindly relying on the more venerable sources like Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jefferson.183  After all, they were merely a part 
(albeit an important one) of the process of formulating the late-
eighteenth-century-American context that created the original 
public meaning that originalists seek.184 
Relying on a broad review of Founding-era sources, rather 
than a selective analysis, helps solve further problems with 
originalist methodology.  Arguments similar to the one we have 
made here have also been made in relation to the textualist slant 
of “new originalism.”185  Both types of originalism suffer the same 
ultimate dilemma:  where multiple sources are legitimate and 
support opposite or inconsistent conclusions, which should we 
choose?186  Alicea and Drakeman posit that  
 
In this kind of case, where the text, read in light of 
all the tools in the New Originalists’ kit, leads to a 
semantic “tie,” it is at least conceivable that a 
sufficiently clear understanding of the provision’s 
meaning to the Framers can be found in the records 
                                                                                                                            
particularly contentious today, as with the 2nd Amendment in Heller, the issue 
was likely contentious at the Founding, admitting huge diversity of opinion 
and reasoned arguments on all sides.  See Evan H. Caminker, State 
Sovereignty and Subordinacy:  May Congress Commandeer State Officers to 
Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1008 1995 (“The proper 
scope of federal authority has been in dispute since the Framing—and so, too, 
has been the proper role of states within that realm of federal authority.”). 
182 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1651–52. 
183 Id. at 1653; see also Whittington, supra note 14, at 609 (observing that 
“new originalism” is less focused on the “concrete intentions” of the Framers 
and more on the “public meaning” of the Constitution at its ratification). 
184 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1653–54; MARCOSSON, supra note 1, at 128 
(calling the Framers “grossly unrepresentative of the population for whom the 
established a government”). 
185 Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39 (“[The] array of inconsistent uses of 
the key constitutional language creates a methodological conundrum for New 
Originalists quite similar to the ‘summing’ problem they have linked with Old 
Originalism.”) 
186 Id. at 57. 
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of the Philadelphia Convention and the state 
ratifying conventions.187 
 
If only things were so simple.  As we have admitted, it appears we 
cannot rely on the Framers, ratifiers, or anyone else in the 
eighteenth century to give us the straight answer on what a 
particular clause meant.   
Acknowledging that originalism has some limited value in 
illuminating constitutional meaning, it does not follow, as 
Thomas would have it, that the Framers’ intended meaning is the 
right one.188  Whatever may be said about their intellectual, 
philosophical, or moral virtues, the Framers did not survive to the 
present day, nor receive portentous visions of the future which 
allowed them to craft a timeless document.189  Many of the 
Framers themselves cautioned against undue deference to their 
views in constitutional interpretation.190  Some even feared that 
                                                 
187 Id. at 64. 
188 Kramer, supra note 1, at 1635 (questioning reliance on the Founding by 
arguing that the Framers themselves recognized “governing as a process 
shaped by experience” and that the Constitution “must be accommodated to 
lessons learned in practice”). 
189 Balkin, supra note 17, at 435 (“The accumulation of these constructions 
over time, as one innovation builds on another, produces a sort of institutional 
evolution; it has a path dependence that drives constitutional development 
forward in ways that no one in 1787 would have predicted.”). 
190 See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 9 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 119, at 72 (“As a guide in 
expounding and applying the provisions of the Constitution, the debates and 
incidental decisions of the Convention can have no authoritative character. 
However desirable it be that they should be preserved as a gratification to the 
laudable curiosity felt by every people to trace the origin and progress of their 
political Institutions, & as a source perhaps of some lights on the Science of 
Govt. the legitimate meaning of the Instrument must be derived from the text 
itself; or if a key is to be sought elsewhere, it must be not in the opinions or 
intentions of the Body which planned & proposed the Constitution, but in the 
sense attached to it by the people in their respective State Conventions where 
it recd. all the Authority which it possesses.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 38 (James 
Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (reasoning that the errors inherent in the 
document may have come from lack of experience on the part of the 
Convention, and that, “on this complicated and difficult subject,” the problems 
and their answers “will not be ascertained until an actual trial shall have 
pointed them out?”); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961) (“‘Tis time only that can mature and perfect so compound a 
system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and can adjust them to each 
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unthinking deference to Framer intent in the future would be 
dangerous to liberty.191  Originalism’s limitations highlight its 
imperfect relevance in today’s world.192  Thomas himself has 
admitted as much.193 
The vital issues of federalism underlying the Haywood 
majority and dissent underscore the effects of changed 
circumstances.  The majority and the line of “valid excuse” cases 
they cite support the proposition that state courts are competent 
to hear federal claims alongside federal courts.194  Some Founders 
argued for such parity because they foresaw the downfall of the 
states to the dominance of the federal government.195  The same 
principle was leveraged in Haywood to not only allow, but indeed 
                                                                                                                            
other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE”); STORY, supra note 89, § 407, 
at 391 n.1 (disparaging the notion of constitutional interpretation by assessing 
the “‘probable meaning’ to be gathered by conjectures from scattered 
documents, from private papers, from the tabletalk of some statesmen, or the 
jealous exaggerations of others”) (emphasis in original); Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 84, at 123–25 (insisting that “periodical 
repairs” to the Constitution would prevent the United States from “falling into 
the same dreadful track” as European monarchs, whose inability to “wisely 
yiel[d] to the gradual change of circumstances” proved disastrous for them and 
their people); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of 
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985) (arguing that no 
interpretational method employed by the Framers was analogous to “modern 
notion of intentionalism,” and that instead early courts and scholars “applied 
standard techniques of statutory construction to the Constitution”). 
191 James Iredell, North Carolina Ratifying Convention Debates, in 4 
ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, supra note 154, at 149. 
192 Whittington, supra note 14, at 605–06 (noting the “dead hand” problem 
of originalist argument). 
193 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2759 (2011) (Thomas, 
J., dissenting) (conceding that “the original public understanding of a 
constitutional provision does not always comport with modern sensibilities” 
and “may also be inconsistent with precedent”). 
194 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2114 (2009). 
195 See THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961) (concluding that a constitution uniting the states would “preven[t] the 
differences that neighbourhood occasions, [and] extinguish[h] that secret 
jealousy, which disposes all States to aggrandise themselves at the expence of 
their neighbours”); THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961) (“[S]tates must be protected as separate political entities so that they 
can serve as countervailing sources of power and reservoirs of liberty”); see also 
supra note 91. 
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require state court adjudication of federal claims.196 
Originalism can accommodate changed circumstances, 
though not without cost.  Instead of looking for the consistency 
and concurrence that never existed at the Founding, originalists 
should instead focus on leveraging originalism as just another 
form of legal reasoning.197  This may not be the most satisfying 
answer for those truly dedicated to interpreting the Constitution 
as the Founders would,198 but it is the only honest route 
available.   
Accepting the view that originalist reasoning is akin to any 
other form of legal reasoning implicates two assumptions that 
originalism should carry with it. 199  First, originalists must 
accept that there is disagreement among Founding-era sources 
and acknowledge that they merely argue in favor of one possible 
interpretation.200  They cannot attempt to solidify their 
conclusions as representative of unanimous consent among the 
Founding generation.  Second, they must expand their arguments 
beyond the scope of the Founders.  In fact, Thomas does an 
                                                 
196 Haywood, 129 S. Ct. at 2117. 
197 See infra notes 212–215 and accompanying text. 
198 Alicea and Drakeman argue that such selectivity is what powers the 
current policy-driven use of originalism.  Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39, at 
60. 
199 In this point we fully accept Larry Kramer’s words of caution, that the 
advocacy that underlies legal training must be somewhat curtailed when 
approached historical analysis.  Larry D. Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 402 (2003).  He summarizes his lesson thus: 
 
An injunction on advocacy is really about avoiding distortion.  
It is about recognizing the difference between making an 
argument and pushing it too far, between defending one's 
conclusions reasonably and misleading readers into thinking 
that support for one's position is stronger than may in fact be 
the case.   
Id. 
200 Thomas Jefferson himself supported this view, which is clearly contrary 
to Thomas’s supposedly neutral approach by which he acts merely as a vessel 
for the opinions of the Framers.  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams 
(Feb. 25, 1823), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 421 (Andrew A 
Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905) (“[M]ultiplied testimony, 
multiplied views will be necessary to give solid establishment to truth.  Much 
is known to one which is not known to another, and no one knows everything.  
It is the sum of individual knowledge which is to make up the whole truth, and 
to give its correct current through future time.”). 
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admirable job of this in Haywood.  After arguing his positions 
from an originalist perspective, he “accept[s] the entirety of the 
Court's precedent in this area” and sets himself up for arguments 
alternative to originalism.201  To that end, he presents theoretical 
arguments about the dichotomy between substantive and 
jurisdictional laws, noting that the New York statute at issue in 
the case operates jurisdictionally and thus cannot discriminate 
against federal claims.202  Nevertheless, our disagreement with 
Thomas is focused on his failure to both recognize the fallibility of 
his originalist analysis and accept even broader non-originalist 
notions such as changed circumstances.  His overzealous 
dedication to originalism foreclosed him from leveraging his full 
potential arsenal against the majority. 
Grudging, if implicit, acknowledgement of this reality has 
already begun in the originalist academy.  Lawrence Solum touts 
the “interpretation/construction” distinction as indicative of a 
more effective “new” originalism.203  This theoretical maneuver 
distinguishes between interpretation, which involves the bare, 
practically objective process of ascertaining the original public 
meaning or Framer view of a word or clause, and construction, 
which acts where real facts require an application of 
constitutional text that is not clearly resolved by 
interpretation.204  Where the result of this inquiry is clear and 
unambiguous, that meaning controls.205  Where the result is 
vague or ambiguous, originalists must ply the “construction 
zone.”206  Here, they still claim to be bound by the interpretation 
they’ve discovered, but are more free to develop divergent views of 
what non-originalist normative or theoretical frameworks will 
help them determine a final application of constitutional 
language.207 
                                                 
201 Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2133 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
202 Id. at 2133–34.  This final point in Thomas’s argument reflects one of 
the several normative and theoretical reasons why we ultimately support 
Thomas’s conclusion.  See supra note 9. 
203 Solum, supra note 42, at 22–24. 
204 Id. at 23. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 69. 
207 Id. at 25–26, 70. 
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Such a method “makes a mountain out of a molehill.”208  
How many clear, unambiguous answers can the Constitution 
provide?  Even simple requirements like the minimum-age 
requirement for the Presidency can be subject to ambiguity.209  
Inviting pluralism in construction undermines originalism’s 
objectivity, which for many is its primary appeal.210  While this 
means that originalism must necessarily prove far less than its 
adherents hope, it is the right move.  Our proposed view of 
originalist analysis accepts the reality that interpretation is 
illuminative but not necessarily controlling.  By incorporating 
originalist interpretation as one element of constitutional 
interpretation, we eviscerate originalism’s unwarranted claims to 
principled finality and preserve only those elements of 
originalism that forthrightly contribute to the vast, diverse mural 
of constitutional meaning. 
 
B. The Need for Compromise 
 
Utilizing a methodology that acknowledges both the 
contributions and limitations of the originalist methodology, we 
can now show how a broad survey of Founding-era sources shows 
that constitutional compromise did not end at the ratified text.  
Instead, it extended beyond the text and into the infant years of 
the republic.   
There are a number of reasons that anyone interested in 
truthful constitutional interpretations should be attracted to this 
idea.  First, traditional originalism can ignore important possible 
sources of illumination.  By focusing on the enacted text, 
originalists necessarily overlook the practical aspects of 
                                                 
208 Solum, supra note 69, at 156. 
209 Bennett, supra note 69, at 85–86.  We return to this clause later to 
further illustrate the need for intentionalism and its role in forming counter-
textual compromise. 
210 Id. at 97, 103; see also Alicea & Drakeman, supra note 39, at 5 
(describing the primary difference between “Old” and “New” originalism as a 
shift away from intentionalism and toward “the objective meaning of the text 
itself”).  Justice Thomas often straddles this divide by purporting to be a strict 
textualist while inviting the “plain meaning” of such text as it was understood 
by the Framers.  Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas:  
Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the 
Constitution, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 351, 362 (2002). 
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constitution-making, particularly compromise that extended 
beyond the text.  For those exploring the Constitution, every word 
and source is vital to exploring what was and was not included in 
the final text and why.  Thus, we cannot ignore the nature of 
political expediency and how it affected the framing and 
ratification of the document. 
The ratification of the Constitution was anything but a 
sure thing at the time of its framing and ratification.211  Many 
were interested not only in amending the document sent to them 
from the Convention, but even in tossing out the whole project 
and beginning anew.212  The Framers took many months to agree 
on a final form for the document.  The Confederation Congress 
was in heated disagreement as to whether they could propose 
amendments to the text or if they were simply charged with 
approving the document for transmission to the state ratification 
conventions.213  Even more concerning was the debate over 
whether the ratification debates themselves could propose or even 
demand amendments.214   
This is the heart of the “all-or-nothing” notion that the 
Federalist supporters of the Constitution put forward.215  They 
argued that a federal government was urgent and vital to protect 
the United States from foreign interference.216  Delay might cost 
the newly-freed nation everything.  The Federalist response to 
the Albany Antifederalists’ influential circular put the point 
eloquently: 
 
THE GRAND AMERICAN UNION has already  
encircled us except on the one side where our 
haughty enemy still bleeds with the wounds of our 
conquest; and  on the other a defenseless seacoast 
                                                 
211 PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION:  THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787-1788 68–69 (2010). 
212 Id. at 76. 
213 Id. at 52–59. 
214 Id. at 59, 295–96, 61–62, 105; see also id. at 118 (noting that some 
ratifiers insisted on recommending amendments even if they themselves could 
not amend the proposed text). 
215 Id. at 68–69 (finding that the Constitution’s supporters’ plan was to “go 
for broke” and work to get the Constitution quickly adopted without delaying 
amendment proposals). 
216 Id. at 261. 
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invites the avarice of an adventitious invader. Our 
neighbors and friends extend their arms to embrace 
us ⎯ UNITE then, ye lovers of our common county.217 
 
Furthermore, continued debate on the content of the Constitution 
would only lead to further confusion, disagreement, and possibly 
endless delay in forming a new government.218  If some states 
required pre-ratification amendments while others did not, 
Edmund Randolph feared it could mean “inevitable ruin to the 
Union.”219  Even Charles Pinckney, who “disliked parts of the 
Constitution,” recognized that “only ‘confusion and contrariety’ 
could result from letting the state recommend amendments to the 
Constitution.”220 
 Nevertheless, many Anti-federalists and state convention 
speakers dismissed the urgency of the Federalist’s plea.221  
Instead, they proposed many changes to the text which they 
expected Congress to consider carefully.222  Some gave only 
conditional ratification that was dependent on certain 
amendments being adopted.223  They asserted that, as the true 
and ultimate sovereigns of the United States, they could not be 
forced to accept a Constitution that was not of their design.224  
Others still called for a second convention, either to review the 
states’ various proposed amendments or start the project over 
from scratch.225 
 
C. The Intentionalist Thesis Revisited 
 
 This volatile environment demanded a pragmatic approach 
from those who wanted to see the current Constitution ratified 
                                                 
217 The 35 Anti-Federal Objections Refuted, by the Federal Committee of 
the City of Albany, April 1788. 
218 MAIER, supra note 109, at 446, 302, 117. 
219 Id. at 261.  John Jay similarly opposed conditional ratification, arguing 
that because some states were “content with [the Constitution] as is,” pre-
ratification amendments by other states would lead to a divisive second 
convention.  Id. at 337. 
220 Id. at 45. 
221 Id. at 231. 
222 Id. 48–49, 398, 302, 421, 45, 261, 117. 
223 Id. 379–80. 
224 Id. at 48, 89. 
225 Id. at 391, 397. 
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and not mired in further amendment proposals or a second 
convention.  In the interest of ratification, supporters on both 
sides made difficult but important compromises in the 
constitutional text that affected not only the meaning of 
otherwise plain language, but also shunted responsibility for 
important elements of government off to later actors, including 
Congress.  Such an idea undermines the constitutional finality 
that originalists so desire, because compromises that pushed 
compromise realization to later generations are just as critical to 
constitutional interpretation as issues that were clearly resolved 
in the final text.226  Any full account of original constitutional 
meaning must acknowledge that post-ratification realities helped 
enunciate the constitutional vision of the Framers and ratifiers 
that could not, for practical purposes, be included in the 
Constitution’s ratified text.227 
 Moreover, the idea of proposed amendments was typically 
closely aligned with compromise that extended post-ratification.  
The Bill of Rights is the clearest example of this practice.  Many 
ratifiers acknowledged the necessity of ratifying the document as 
it stood.228  Their assent to ratification was thus vitally dependent 
on Article V and its amendment processes.229  Their 
understanding of the Constitution at the time of ratification, 
then, was one that included a clear need for post-ratification 
dialogue, development, and Congressional action.  Congress did 
its duty by quickly proposing the first ten amendments to the 
Constitution.230  We would argue that such a compromise is 
equally important to any compromise struck in the text itself. 
 This view at first blush appears quite similar to the 
orthodox interpretation of such grand compromises as the 
Madisonian Compromise.  We propose a different view of the 
nature of that and other compromises, as discussed in greater 
detail below.  Instead of the traditional view which vested 
discretion in later actors to act consistently with the broad 
themes of the Constitution, here we argue that the clauses 
                                                 
226 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., ORIGINALISM, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTERPRISE:  A HISTORICAL INQUIRY 5, 25 (2007). 
227 See Solum, supra note 42, at 53. 
228 See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text. 
229 See MAIER, supra note 109, at 48–49, 397. 
230 Maeva Marcus, Speech, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 115, 118 (1992).  
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operative on state-court jurisdictional obligations were in fact 
mostly settled by the Framing and ratifying conventions.  Their 
debates acknowledged opposing views of the extent of effectual 
federal power and the need to preserve state sovereignty.  In the 
end, lower federal courts were deemed necessary to strike a 
proper balance between national and state governments, but the 
Supremacy Clause and other clauses were construed in a very 
limited fashion in order to protect states from consolidation or 
domination under the new federal government.  Particularly in 
the context of Article III, these compromises did not, as many 
uncritically conclude, mean that Congress had unlimited 
discretion to refuse to create lower federal courts.  Counter to the 
otherwise plain meaning of Article III, the Framers and ratifiers 
accepted the text of that clause for prudential and practical 
reasons, all the while understanding that the real compromise 
was concluded and only its implementation was left to Congress. 
 At this point we should address an issue that will be clear 
to many readers after reading the previous Part:  why the focus 
on Framer and ratifier intent?  “New” originalism touts the 
objectivity of original public meaning as a more principled way to 
approach constitutional interpretation.231  Nevertheless, modern 
intentionalists roundly pan the alleged “objectivity” of this new 
approach, and it is this supposed objectivity that stands in the 
way of our counter-textual readings of Article III and the 
Supremacy Clause. 
 In a recent work defending and criticizing contemporary 
iterations of originalist methodology, Larry Alexander and 
Stanley Fish offer convincing arguments based in linguistic 
theory that Framer and ratifier intent is the only legitimate 
source for originalist interpretation.232  First, Fish notes that 
there cannot logically be meaning without intention.233  Any 
author intends the signs and symbols he uses to embody a 
particular meaning based on his circumstances, his audience, and 
a number of other factors.234  Such signs carry no meaning 
                                                 
231 Solum, supra note 42, at 13–14. 
232 THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
233 Stanley Fish, The Intentionalist Thesis Once More, in THE CHALLENGE 
OF ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 102 (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
234 Id. at 101. 
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whatsoever prior to their deployment in a purposive act of 
communication.235  In other words, an author’s meaning is the 
true meaning of the text, notwithstanding what message is 
communicated or miscommunicated to the reader.236   
 Fish acknowledges that an author’s intention to deploy the 
original public meaning of the words he uses may be a default 
assumption.237  However, he counters that such an assumption 
must be argued for.238  The author’s intention to either use or 
flout conventional meanings is never apparent from the text 
itself.239  Thus original public meaning is just one possibility 
within a world of possible authorial intent. 
 One example Fish provides is the distinction between 
commonplace and poetic language.  Whereas an author’s intent to 
deploy commonplace meanings is consistent with original public 
meaning, the author’s choice to use a poetic style of language, one 
in which meaning is not apparent from the text itself but instead 
hidden for the reader to discover, is not.240  This example 
highlights a part of Fish’s intentionalists thesis that is critical to 
our argument:  “[s]traightforwardness and ambiguity are the 
properties not of language, but of intentions.”241  The only way to 
resolve the question of whether a text is ambiguous or 
straightforward is to approach it with assumptions about the 
author’s intention to use language in a straightforward or 
ambiguous manner.242   
 An example here will help illuminate the importance of 
this principle.  Consider the Presidential age requirement:  
“neither shall any Person be eligible to [the office of President] 
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years.”243  
Enumerating a numerical value would appear to be immutable.244  
                                                 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 101–02. 
237 Id. at 107. 
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 103, 107. 
240 Id. at 112. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 113. 
243 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. 
244 Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 312 (2010) (“[T]he age requirement for presidents is one of 
countless points of constitutional law on which a practical consensus holds 
across competing interpretive methods.”). 
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However, the clarity of such a phrase is absolutely dependent on 
the intentions of the author to choose this meaning.  It is at least 
conceivable, with admittedly some creativity, that the Framers 
and ratifiers intended the numerical requirement to represent an 
age of maturity commensurate with the requirements of the 
presidential office.245  One need not even accept that the authors 
intended such a counter-textual meaning in order to recognize the 
heart of the matter, that even conventional meanings originate 
only in intention. 
 Solum would argue that original public meaning is still a 
legitimate source for interpretation because the Framers and 
ratifiers must have intended to use the conventional meanings of 
their day.246  This would promote clearer understanding of the 
text at the time of ratification and aid later readers in 
interpretation because such meaning is supposedly readily 
ascertainable.  But our account of the exigencies of compromise 
counters this view:  despite any supposed concern for clarity, the 
Constitution’s supporters’ overriding concern was with 
ratification.  Clarity would certainly have been the ideal.  It 
would have provided later interpreters with clear textual 
commands.  Nevertheless, the desire for successful adoption of the 
Constitution required that the Framers and ratifiers set desires 
for clarity aside in the interest of pushing the document through 
the state ratifying conventions.  Because of this dominant 
concern, we cannot assume, as Solum would, that the Framers 
and ratifiers unequivocally supported interpretation consistent 
with the conventional meanings of their words at the Founding.  
We argue instead that they employed a non-standard set of 
meanings for the words they used that preserved ambiguity in 
name only, based on the intent to promote ratification at the cost 
of clarity.247  For example, we have shown that the supposed 
authority vested in Congress to create or not create lower federal 
courts was vacuous.  Such language was left in place merely to 
prevent further delays in ratification. 
 Furthermore, Larry Alexander provides substantial 
evidence that reliance on original public meaning does not 
                                                 
245 Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American Constitution, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 133, 169 (1997). 
246 Solum, supra note 42, at 15–16. 
247 Fish, supra note 129, at 117. 
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provide the objectivity that originalists like Solum strive for in 
the “interpretation” zone.  He echoes Fish’s intentionalists 
approach when he argues that there can be no communication 
without the author intending a particular message.248  Original 
public meaning fails not because it is an untenable intention an 
author might deploy, but rather because the pursuit of original 
public meaning substitutes the actual authors’ and ratifiers’ 
intents with the intent of a hypothetical Framer or ratifier.249  
This method also requires manufacturing a hypothetical reader 
for the document at the time of its ratification.250  The normative 
assumptions inherent in such constructs—their fluency in 
contemporary English, their social status, their knowledge of 
political affairs of the day—undermine the supposed objectivity 
original public meaning proponents offer.251  Moreover, Alexander 
posits that hypothesizing authors invites goal-specific 
subjectivity, where the scholar deploying original public meaning 
accepts or rejects available normative assumptions based on 
argumentative need.252 
 This approach does not solve all of originalism’s problems.  
As Fish readily concedes, there are no formulas for determining 
authorial intent in a given situation.253  As he notes, to make an 
intentionalists argument, “[y]ou just have to sit down and do it, 
every time.”254  This admission complements our view of 
originalism’s contributions to constitutional interpretation 
outlined above.  Because there is no objective, consistent way to 
determine authorial intent for any given clause in the 
Constitution, originalism provides results that are far less useful 
than its proponents would admit.  In the end, “[t]he only thing 
going for ‘the intentionalists thesis] is that it is true.”255  Thus, 
                                                 
248 Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF 
ORIGINALISM:  THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 88 (Grant 
Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
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the intended meanings of any of an indefinite number of possible hypothetical 
authors.”) 
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255 Id. at 116. 
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originalism’s limited, non-dispositive nature makes it only one 
among many methods for illuminating the Constitution.  Further, 
the focus on authorial intention opens the door for counter-textual 
readings of the Constitution that respect compromises not readily 
apparent on the document’s face. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The Supremacy Clause, Article III, Article I, and the State 
Judges Clause all have been relied upon to support an obligation 
for state courts to hear federal claims.  We have developed 
another view here that contravenes the prevailing orthodoxy.  
First, the historical record does not support an anti-
discrimination principle inherent in the Supremacy Clause.  
Founding era debates were primarily directed at controlling 
overwhelming federal power and the need to preserve state 
sovereignty, and the Supremacy Clause is thus best understood 
as a choice-of-law rule that gives preemptive effect to validly 
enacted, substantive federal laws.  Second, neither Article III nor 
Article I provides Congress with the power to oblige state courts 
to hear federal claims.  Critically, the Madisonian Compromise 
vested discretion in Congress to control the creation of lower 
federal courts, but this discretion did not realistically include the 
option not to create lower federal courts at all. Rather, lower 
federal courts of some kind were essentially guaranteed in the 
minds of the Framers so as to properly balance the national and 
state governments.  In short, the Constitution does not restrict 
the power of states to define the jurisdiction of their courts, even 
when that power is used to close the state’s courts to federal 
business. 
  
 
